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  We examine the supply of DSL broadband by the incumbent local exchange company 
(LEC) in five U.S. states in the earlier years of deployment. Our empirical analysis shows that 
income, other demographics, and cost factors are important determinants of entry and 
availability, and thus, the supply side of the digital divide. After controlling for other factors, the 
racial characteristics of the area do not affect DSL provision. Active competition in broadband 
from competitive LECs reduces deployment of DSL by the incumbent, but potential competition 
from competitive LECs has the opposite effect. Competition from cable companies also 
negatively influences the incumbent’s decision to supply DSL. Our objective in gauging the 
importance of the various factors is to highlight the important drivers of broadband provision for 
policy makers. Even though some form of broadband access is available in most areas of the 
U.S. today, the lessons learned from looking at the early years of adoption are still important for 
two reasons. Understanding what drives initial DSL deployment lends insight into what drives 
increasing competition, the best hope for lower service prices. Furthermore, many less developed 




The worldwide explosion in the growth of broadband infrastructure is allowing 
countries to enjoy productivity gains in industries that heavily use communications.  
Consumers also are deriving increased benefits from the availability of broadband 
connection to the Internet, as the technology speeds up some applications (e.g., 
downloading music) and creates entirely new possibilities (e.g., telemedicine).
1  
Households typically connect to the Internet through digital subscriber line (DSL) service 
provided on their telephone line or through cable modem service.  Although broadband 
technology of these and other types is diffusing rapidly, some policy makers in the U.S. 
and abroad are concerned that not all regions within countries are receiving broadband 
access at the same time.  The phenomenon of unequally diffusing information and 
communications technology is known as the “digital divide.”  The digital divide in the 
U.S. takes the form of a well-documented gap in computer and Internet usage between 
richer and poorer households, majority and minority groups, and urban and rural areas 
(Newberger, 2001; NTIA, 2002; Mills and Whitacre, 2003; Fairlie, 2004).  Broadband 
Internet access has become one of the latest aspects of the digital divide to be discussed, 
examined, and lamented in arenas of public policy.   
In the early years of broadband Internet adoption, the U.S. Department of 
Commerce (NTIA, 2000) issued an influential report showing that black and Hispanic 
households had less access to broadband Internet access than did white households.  The 
report also found that households in rural areas were less likely than urban households to 
                                                 
1 Crandall and Jackson (2003) estimate that the value of the benefits to consumers in the U.S. from 
broadband Internet access (net of subscription cost) reaches the hundreds of billions of dollars yearly. 
  3subscribe to broadband access, and that lower-income households lagged the subscription 
rates of more affluent households.  The U.S. Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) opined that low subscription to broadband services in rural, low-income, and 
minority areas was due at least in part to a lack of availability (FCC, 2000a).  Since 
availability—the supply of broadband infrastructure by communications providers—is 
necessary for the household to subscribe to broadband service, fundamental analysis of 
the broadband digital divide must begin on the supply side.       
What are the determinants of the supply side of the digital divide?  Both the 
demographic characteristics of the territory and competition among broadband service 
providers play a role in entry in the broadband market.  The racial composition and 
income of a market may influence broadband supply directly through overt 
discrimination (sometimes called “redlining” in the U.S.) on the part of the providers, or 
(more likely, according to the profit maximization hypothesis and Prieger (2003)), 
through reducing the demand in an area (and therefore the profit) perceived by a potential 
supplier.  Competition in local communications also affects broadband access.  For 
example, incumbent telephone and cable companies may be more likely to provide 
broadband access to “meet the competition” when they face broadband competitors (the 
competitive stimulus hypothesis).  On the other hand, if potential entrants deem a market 
large enough to support one broadband provider but not two, then the availability of cable 
modem service (for example) will discourage deployment of DSL (the carrying capacity, 
or market size, hypothesis modeled by Bresnahan and Reiss (1987)).  If competition is an 
important driver of broadband availability, then policy efforts to close the digital divide 
should encourage competition.  Although the data we examine are from the U.S., the 
  4public policy concerns of the digital divide and the issue of the role of competition in 
broadband rollout are universal.  
In this chapter, we examine the supply of DSL broadband by the incumbent local 
exchange company (LEC) in five Midwestern states in the U.S.  Our objective is to gauge 
the importance in the DSL entry decision of the various market and competitive factors 
discussed above.  The preliminary findings in this study show that there is no evidence 
that race per se matters in the supply of DSL once the impact of the income of the area is 
removed.  However, household income does matter, with lower-income areas receiving 
less access.  We also find that the education levels, average length of commute, size of 
firms in the area, and costs affect the deployment of DSL.  The effect of competition in 
the area is in accord with the carrying capacity hypothesis.   
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A growing body of literature exists on the determinants of broadband availability in 
an area.  Our study has the advantage of examining a precise geographical market for 
DSL deployment, the wire center serving area.  This allows us to gather exact 
demographic characteristics of the markets, as would be considered by the decision 
makers at the potential broadband providers.  Previous studies in the economics literature 
looking at deployment throughout the U.S. typically examine postal service code areas
2 
(Flamm, 2005; Xiao and Orazem, 2005; Grubesic and Murray, 2004; Prieger 2003) or 
counties (Gillett and Lehr, 1999), neither of which conform to telecommunications 
geography.  Gabel and Kwan (2001) also use the wire center serving area as the unit of 
                                                 
2  Postal codes are known as “ZIP codes” in the U.S. 
  5observation.  Studies considering broadband diffusion within a state or metropolitan area 
have used other geographical units.  For example, Grubesic (2003) uses the finest level of 
geography available for each type of provider (townships for cable modem providers and 
wire centers for DSL providers) in his study of broadband availability in Ohio. 
The studies on the determinants of broadband availability generally confirm that 
rural and low-income areas are less likely to have broadband available, but the set of 
variables included in the estimations can greatly influence the conclusions.  For example, 
Prieger (2003) uses a nationally comprehensive broadband survey by the FCC to examine 
the income and racial aspects of the supply side of the digital divide.  The author shows 
that if the only area characteristics included in an estimation for the availability of 
broadband are the racial composition, urban density, and the identity of the incumbent 
telephone company, then areas with more minorities appear to be less likely to have 
broadband.  However, one cannot draw a causal link between race and supply-side overt 
discrimination, because once Prieger (2003) controls for income, the statistical 
significance of the racial composition of the area disappears.  Furthermore, when Prieger 
(2003) introduces additional demographic and business characteristics of the area to the 
estimation, the author found that there is no evidence of unequal availability based on 
race or income, except for Native Americans.  Rural location and demand characteristics 
such as age, education, commuting time, gender, and size of businesses in the area were 
determinants of broadband availability that were more important.   
There are many more studies on household-level demand for broadband Internet 
access than there are on supply (see other chapters of this book for citations).  A few 
studies (Burnstein and Aron, 2003; Wallsten, 2005) commingle supply and demand and 
  6examine the factors determining the state-level penetration rate (the ratio of subscribers to 
total households in a state).  These studies consider the impact of competition (among 
other factors) on the penetration rate.  Burnstein and Aron (2003) find that intermodal 
competition between cable companies and telecommunications firms is positively 
correlated with broadband penetration.  In a similar vein, Wallsten (2005) finds that states 
with more competition in local telephony (as proxied by the number of telephone lines 
sold by competitive local exchange carriers) have higher broadband penetration rates.  
One disadvantage of using state-level penetration rates is that the relatively small number 
of observations makes identifying driving factors problematic. 
The most ambitious of the broadband entry studies, those mentioned above using 
the FCC data from postal service code areas, are subject to criticism because broadband 
access is not necessarily ubiquitous in an area.
3  Thus, using characteristics of the postal 
code areas subjects the broadband deployment estimations to measurement error bias, 
since the characteristics of the actual geographical market may differ.
4  By examining the 
actual unit of deployment of DSL, the central office area, in our study we are able to test 
conclusions from earlier studies in a setting free from the measurement error bias that 
stems from geographical imprecision.  For example, we find that there is no evidence that 
race matters in the supply of DSL, other things equal, which confirms the finding of 
Prieger (2003).  We thus lend credence to the methods used in the previous studies.  
                                                 
3 The FCC data list a ZIP code if there is at least one broadband subscriber whose premises are in the ZIP 
code area.  Researchers then treat the listed codes as having broadband available, and all ZIP codes not on 
the list as not having broadband available.  In large ZIP code areas, not all parts of a ZIP code on the FCC’s 
list may be in the actual broadband service areas, however.  Prieger (2003) and Flamm (2005) discuss the 
issue at length. 
4 Measurement error bias is also known as error-in-variables bias.  See Cameron and Trivedi (2005, ch. 26) 
for a textbook treatment of the issue.   
  7THE DECISION TO DEPLOY BROADBAND 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
There are several steps involved when a household connects to the Internet via 
broadband access.  Consider the case of DSL first, the mode of access examined in this 
chapter.  Data moves across various networks from the Internet backbone until it reaches 
the local exchange carrier’s central office.  The central office is the carrier’s point of 
presence in the local exchanges, and contains the telecommunications switching and DSL 
multiplexing equipment.  From the central office, data is transmitted over a DSL 
connection residing on the telephone line between the central office and the subscriber’s 
premises.   In cable data networks, data flows from the Internet through the cable 
company’s headend (a cable service provider’s version of the local exchange carrier’s 
central office), and on to regional high-capacity data networks. To reach the cable 
modem subscriber’s premises, data travels through local fiber optic networks and finally 
over coaxial cable.  Wireless and satellite carriers also offer broadband capability, 
although such firms typically focus on the business market and have small market 
shares.
5  Thus, for residential subscribers, cable modem service and DSL are the 
broadband options of choice in the U.S., with cable modems enjoying about a three to 
one advantage around 2000, the vintage of the data analyzed here.
6  The FCC found as 
early as 2000 that the Internet backbone and the networks between the backbone and the 
                                                 
5 Local telephone companies also lease high-speed dedicated circuit access lines to residences and 
businesses, but their high prices generally restrict them to high-volume business use.  More recently, some 
telephone companies have also begun to deploy fiber optic cable in the last mile network, but most of such 
investment occurred after the period of the data examined here. 
6 According to official statistics for residences and small businesses in the U.S., there were 2,179,749 
coaxial cable broadband lines in 2000, compared to 771,311 DSL lines (FCC, 2000b).  The remainder of 
the 3,120,350 broadband lines consisted of dedicated lines (T-1) rented from phone companies, satellite and 
fixed wireless lines, and fiber optic lines. 
  8telephone central offices and the cable company headends were generally adequate to 
provide broadband access (FCC, 2000a).  The so-called “last mile” to the subscribers’ 
premises is the limiting factor on the supply side of the market. 
A broadband carrier’s decision to enter a market depends on the expected demand, 
costs, and entry by other firms.  The entry decision depends on the expected profits 
E(π(t,w,z(t),ε)), where π is the profit flow at time t, w is a vector of demographics of the 
area and other observed variables, z represents the competitors’ entry decisions (itself a 
function of time), and ε is a random variable reflecting uncertainty about future 
profitability.  Flow profits depend explicitly on time because, for example, the cost of 
telecommunications equipment falls over time.  Entry also depends on the fixed cost 
incurred at time of deployment, C(t).  Given a discount rate r, a risk-neutral firm has an 
optimal adoption time t* for a particular market defined by: 
 





− ∞ − − = ∫ ε π  
 
Entry time t* may be treated as a random variable from the standpoint of the 
econometrician, who not observe all the relevant elements of the decision (including the 
firm’s subjective probability distribution for ε) that the firm takes into account.  Then the 
probability that DSL has been deployed in area i as of the time T of our data is 
 
 Pr(ti* < T |x) (1) 
where x is the subset of (w,z) observed in the data.  We use the probit model as our 
econometric specification of (1), where the dependent variable yi is a binary indicator for 
  9DSL availability in the market.  Using the probit model is tantamount to assuming that 
the distribution of random variable T, conditional on x, is standard normal.
7 Thus the 
empirical specification is 
 
yi = 1 if ti* < T, 0 otherwise 
 Pr(yi = 1|x) = Φ(β'xi) (2) 
where β is a vector of coefficients to be estimated and Φ is the standard normal 
cumulative density function. 
DATA 
In October 1999, SBC and Ameritech merged.  Both companies were dominant 
telecommunications service providers,
8 albeit in different locations.  As such, their 
merger required FCC approval in addition to the usual scrutiny by the Department of 
Justice.  The FCC approved the transaction subject to certain conditions, including the 
promotion of advanced services such as broadband Internet access by the company.  
Failure to meet the conditions was to trigger penalty payments of more than $2 billion in 
payments.  In particular, SBC was required to locate at least 10% of their advanced 
service facilities in low-income areas in the Ameritech region.
9  State regulators in 
Ameritech’s operating region (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin) also 
pushed the merged firm to accelerate broadband deployment.  The regulators’ concern 
was that Ameritech had made slow progress deploying DSL compared to other major 
                                                 
7 See Cameron and Trivedi (2005, ch. 14) for a textbook treatment of the probit model. 
8 SBC and Ameritech were both Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs), formerly known as the 
Baby Bells after the breakup of AT&T.  The merged entity kept the name SBC, and later adopted the 
moniker AT&T after merging with that firm in 2005. 
9 SBC’s SEC filings from the time discuss these conditions. 
  10telephone companies in other areas of the U.S.  Precise statistics at the company level on 
DSL deployment are closely held data, and so comparisons must rely on estimates, but 
one industry source calculated that at the end of 1999, Ameritech had only 2% as many 
DSL lines in service as the next smallest dominant telephone company in the U.S.
10
To allow regulators to gauge Ameritech’s progress in implementing DSL, as part of 
the regulatory contract the company made available a list of their DSL subscribers by 
nine-digit postal code (known as ZIP+4 codes) as of March 2000.  The data are a 
snapshot of DSL deployment as of shortly after the merger, and established a baseline to 
which regulators could compare future deployment.  ZIP+4 areas are typically very small 
geographic areas, comprising a few blocks worth of addresses at most.  The list contains 
every ZIP+4 code in Ameritech’s subscriber database and the deployment date, and 
allows us to see which central offices had DSL deployed.   
In addition to the DSL deployment list, the other data for the study come from five 
other sources:  a GIS database of ZIP+4 codes and locations, a GIS telecommunications 
wire center database, the FCC local competition database, and two Census data sources 
for household demographic and business information.  A complete list of variables and 
summary statistics for the data are in Table 1. 
Given the nascent state of the market in the region in 2000, the data are from the 
early years of broadband roll out in the area.  The advantage to examining data from the 
early years is that there was still much geographic variation in the availability of 
broadband, which allows identification of the impact of explanatory variables on 
                                                 
10 Ameritech’s estimated 45 thousand DSL lines are 2.0% of US West’s 2.2 million lines (CED, “DSL 
technology looms ever larger,” December 1999, p.100).  The same source estimates 17 million lines for 
Bell Atlantic, 5 million lines for Bell South, and 9.8 million lines for SBC/Pacific Bell. 
  11deployment.  Today’s nearly ubiquitous coverage in U.S. urban and suburban areas does 
not allow researchers to apply fruitfully similar methodology to current data. 
DSL Availability Data 
There are over 170,000 entries in the Ameritech DSL ZIP+4 list.  This implies that 
there are at least that many DSL subscribers, which means that either the external 
industry source mentioned above grossly undercounted DSL lines, or Ameritech enjoyed 
a phenomenal growth rate over the three months between the two data collection dates.   
The pattern of deployment can be seen by plotting the centroids of the ZIP+4 areas with 
DSL.  Figure 1 shows all the ZIP deployments in the five-state region.
11  The striking 
picture shows that DSL is available in only a small fraction of the total geography.  
However, it is important to remember that we do not observe DSL deployed by 
incumbent phone companies other than Ameritech, and that Ameritech is not the 
incumbent carrier in many rural areas in these states.  In Illinois, all deployment is in the 
extended Chicago area.  There is no DSL in Indiana. In Michigan, most deployment is in 
the Detroit area.  In Ohio all DSL is around Cleveland.  The few DSL customers in 
Wisconsin live in the Milwaukee area.  These are the most populous areas in the region. 
DSL, as deployed by Ameritech at least, clearly lags other forms of broadband 
infrastructure in the region, as suggested by the official statistics cited above.  Figure 2 
compares the Ameritech DSL locations with the comprehensive FCC data on five digit 
ZIP codes with broadband access for Illinois.  Many parts of the state have broadband 
access from non-Ameritech sources.  Only in the Chicago area does the Ameritech DSL 
deployment come close to matching deployment from all sources.  
                                                 
11 The state abbreviations in the figure are Illinois (IL), Indiana (IN), Ohio (OH), Michigan (MI), and 
Wisconsin (WI). 
  12The local exchange carrier implements DSL in the central office, and so the 
relevant decision unit is a central office serving area.  Although it is theoretically possible 
that Ameritech could choose not to offer DSL to certain neighborhoods within a serving 
area, as a marketing decision the company offers it to all neighborhoods in area.
12  We 
determined which central offices were DSL capable by matching the ZIP+4 centroids on 
the DSL list to the central office areas.
13  Our dependent variable in the estimations is an 
observation on a central office area, equal to one if DSL is deployed or zero if not.  The 
sample includes all Ameritech central offices in the five-state region, which yields 1,120 
observations.
14     
Market Characteristics Data 
We model the deployment decision as a probit function of demand variables, cost 
factors, and the competitive environment.   
Demand Variables 
Socioeconomic statistics at the block or block group level from the 2000 U.S. 
Bureau of the Census decennial census capture factors influencing carriers’ expected 
subscriber demand for broadband.  We aggregate the variables to the central office area 
for the entry estimations.
15  These variables proxy the expected post-entry price and 
                                                 
12 Due to technological restrictions at the time, transmission speeds degrade beyond 2.2 miles.  Therefore, 
homes in the area may not have access if they are too far from the central office.  The distance limitation 
can be seen in figure 2 from the circular clusters of DSL points, each of which surrounds a central office. 
13 We matched the ZIP+4 centroids to central offices using ArcMap GIS software and GDT’s WireCenter 
Premium telecommunications geography product. 
14 When there were between one and nine DSL ZIP+4’s in the central office area (18 out of over 1,100 
central offices), we removed the central office from the estimation to be conservative, because these might 
be “stray” ZIP+4’s that do not actually belong in the DSL list.  The average number of ZIP+4’s in a DSL-
capable central office is 800.   
15 Blocks are the smallest unit of U.S. Census geography, and typically contain about 10-30 households.  
Some statistics, such as household income, are available at the block group level but not at the block level.  
Block groups typically contain about 600 households.  We aggregated the statistics at the Census block or 
block group level to the central office serving area using the GIS software. 
  13profit in the DSL deployment estimations.  The variables include racial breakdown of the 
area, Hispanic ethnicity, income, market size and composition, rural, age and education 
profile, gender ratio, commute time, and telephone penetration.  An additional set of 
business-market related variables (the average number of workers per firm and the 
percentage of firms that have fewer than 20 employees) are taken from Census sources 
for establishment and employment counts at the postal code level.
16    
Costs 
Various studies and industry sources suggest that relevant cost considerations for 
broadband deployment are fixed costs, subscriber density, and the vintage of the 
telecommunications infrastructure.
17  Controls for these costs include subscriber density 
and a proxy for the vintage of the local telecommunications networks (median age of the 
housing structures) in the area.  For a more complete explanation of broadband costs and 
these variables, refer to Prieger (2003).   
Local Telecommunications And Broadband Competition 
Local telecommunications competition had started to spring up at the time since 
the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  Anecdotal evidence from the 
industry suggests that incumbent local exchange carriers are more likely to offer 
advanced services in areas in which they face competition, although the endogeneity of 
entry prevents any conclusion of causality from this observation.
18  Some facilities-based 
competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) offer DSL.  CLECs can offer DSL in 
                                                 
16 The business data are from U.S. Bureau of the Census, ZIP Code Business Patterns CD-ROM, 2000 data.  
The ZIP code areas were matched to the central office areas using GIS software. 
17 See Faulhaber and Hogendorn (2000) and Gabel and Kwan (2001), for example. 
18 The endogeneity issue is that there are characteristics of markets, such as high household income, that 
make entry by both competitors and the incumbent more likely.  In such cases, the correlation between the 
competitors’ and the incumbent’s decisions do not provide proof that the competitors’ presence causes 
DSL deployment by the incumbent. 
  14Ameritech’s serving area even if Ameritech does not itself deploy DSL in the central 
office, by collocating their own equipment in the incumbent’s central office and renting 
the subscriber line to the customer’s premises. 
The FCC makes available a list of postal codes in which there is local 
competition.  In some specifications, we include an indicator variable, CLEC presence, 
for the presence of at least one competing local exchange company (CLEC) in the area.  
The FCC data do not indicate whether the competitor offers DSL, however, and so CLEC 
presence indicates only the potential for competition.  We collected information on actual 
competition in DSL from CLECs from New Paradigm Resources Group (2001).  The 
data from NPRG lists which CLECs operate in which cities, and whether they offer 
DSL.
19  For a subset of ZIP codes, we also have data on deployment of cable modem 
service, which we matched to our central office serving areas.  The cable modem data 
cover a random sample of ZIP codes across the five states
20 except for Ohio, where 
coverage is complete.
21    
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
The estimations for the determinants of DSL entry, based in equation (2), are 
reported in Tables 2 and following.   
                                                 
19 The data from NPRG are not as geographically precise as our other data, because the CLEC locations are 
listed by city or suburb name.  We matched the city names to the central office areas by hand. 
20 These data were collected by Kevin Duffy-Deno and are described more fully in Duffy-Deno (2000) and 
Rappoport et al. (2003).  We gratefully acknowledge permission to use these data. 
21 The cable modem data for Ohio are from Grubesic (2003).  We gratefully acknowledge permission to use 
these data. 
  15The Digital Divide 
Table 2 contains two estimations that show an apparent supply-side digital divide 
based on race and income.  Recall that the unit of observation is an Ameritech central 
office area.  In all tables, we report the probit coefficients, the marginal effects of the 
variables, and the p-value for the hypothesis that the coefficient is zero.  The marginal 
effect of a variable expresses the change in the estimated probability that broadband is 
deployed from a unit change in the variable (evaluated at sample averages of the data).   
In Estimation 1, we control for nothing except race and market size.  Areas with 
high concentrations of blacks, Native Americans, and “other” races (as defined by the 
Census categories) are significantly less likely to have DSL available.  Areas with many 
Asians and (surprisingly) Hispanics are significantly more likely to have access to DSL.  
This simple portrait of the digital divide is incomplete, however.  An obvious question is 
whether race is a causal determinant of broadband deployment or is merely correlated 
with other demographic characteristics upon which firms base their entry decision, such 
as income, education, and the business market.  In Estimation 2, we add income 
variables.  Access to DSL is correlated with higher income and fewer households in 
poverty, although the latter coefficient is not significant.  Important to note is that the 
significant negative effects for blacks, Native Americans, and other races disappear.  The 
coefficient for blacks switches sign, and is now significantly positive.  Thus, income 
appears to be a more important factor contributing to the digital divide on the supply side 
than race per se. 
  16Demographic and Economic Factors 
In Estimations 3 and 4, we add a host of other demographic and economic 
variables.  The distinction between the two is the addition of state fixed effects in 
estimation 4.  The fixed effects add a state-specific intercept term to the index β'xi in 
equation (2).  The addition of state fixed effects removes the impact of any factor, 
observed or not, that varies among states but not within a state.  Examples of such factors 
include the state regulatory environment, unique or historical reasons why costs of 
provision differ among states, and average demand and supply conditions.  Adding state 
effects necessitates dropping observations from Indiana, where no DSL was in place.  
Except for some of the education variables, there are no statistically significant large 
differences between the coefficients in the two estimations.
22
The education level of the area has a curious correlation with DSL access.  The 
excluded educational category in the estimation is high school education, and all 
coefficients are positive relative to this category.  The largest positive effect is for “less 
than high school” education.  Perhaps inner urban areas with low average educational 
attainment but other desirable characteristics (from the firm’s point of view), such as 
business demand, are driving this result.  More expected is that the fraction of people 
with some college education or higher positively affects the probability of DSL.
23
Commuting has the expected impact.  There are large positive effects for the “work 
at home” variable, perhaps due to demand for telecommuting.  For those who commute, 
entry rises with the length of the commute up to one hour, which may reflect a 
                                                 
22 The apparently large differences in some of the coefficients do not translate into significant differences in 
the marginal effects. 
23 The unexpected result for the less than high school coefficient is not an artifact of collinearity; the 
variable is not highly correlated with any variables expected to increase the likelihood of deployment. 
  17combination of urban area effects (urban areas have more demand for DSL) and stronger 
demand for telecommuting.  The industry press has noted the link between longer 
commuting times and demand for broadband access (NPRG, 2006).  The longest 
commuting category (over an hour) causes the probability of access to fall, which is 
probably a reflection of low rural demand for broadband (perceived or real on the part of 
the firm).  An interesting finding is that areas with more women are less likely to have 
access to DSL.  Median age of the area has an inverted U relationship to access, with the 
maximum occurring around age 40 to 45.  The impact of age might reflect lower demand 
for Internet access among the elderly and the very young.
24   
Regarding business demand, access rises with the average number of workers per 
firm, but also with the fraction of firms that have fewer than 20 employees.  The latter 
probably reflects that DSL is an especially attractive broadband access option for small 
businesses, given its low price in comparison to high-speed dedicated 
telecommunications lines (so-called “special access” lines) and the relative lack of 
availability of cable modem service to business addresses.
25  In a separate estimation 
(results not reported), we added variables for the percent of the businesses in the area in 
various industrial categories.  While some of the categories had significant effects, they 
did not change the main results of interest.
26
                                                 
24 Fox (2004) documents low demand among the elderly, and finds that in 2000, only 15% of Americans 
age 65 or older reported having access to the Internet.  Low demand for household broadband subscription 
among younger adults may reflect both lack of income and the availability of broadband at school or work 
as a substitute for access at home. 
25 Cable companies built their networks to offer primarily residential service. 
26 The main changes were that the statistical significance of the Asian and income variables declined, 
compared to estimation 3.  The industry category of “finance and insurance” and of “real estate” had 
significant negative effects and the category of “professional, scientific and technical services” had positive 
effects on deployment.  The former results are probably indicative of the other broadband options taken by 
firms in these communications-intensive industries.  The incumbent marketed DSL at the time toward 
  18The cost variables mostly have the expected signs.  Denser areas, measured by 
population or telephone penetration, have higher probability of access to DSL.  Rural 
areas, defined in accord with the Census definition of a density less than 500 persons per 
square mile, have lower access.  The marginal effects indicate that Ameritech was 4 to 10 
percentage points (depending on which estimation is used) less likely to deploy DSL in 
its rural central offices than in its urban ones.  Older infrastructure, as proxied by 
structure age, has a negative impact—at least for levels of the variable above the median.  
Younger structure ages show the opposite sign, but neither coefficient is significant in 
estimation 4.   
The Impact of Competition 
The carrying capacity, or market size, hypothesis states that competition from 
CLECs and cable modem providers should make the provision of DSL less attractive to 
the phone company, other things equal.  Some markets may be large enough to support 
one entrant only, and if the cable company or a CLEC already offers broadband, then the 
phone company may delay DSL provision until the market grows.  An alternative 
hypothesis is that competition provides competitive stimulus to telecommunications 
investment (Willig, 2003; Aghion et al. 2001).
27  To test which of these hypotheses better 
fits the data, we examine how competition affects the probability of DSL deployment.  
                                                                                                                                                 
home and small-business users, since the phone company had little incentive to cannibalize demand for the 
high-speed (and high-cost) dedicated circuits it leased to businesses. 
27 Willig (2003) characterizes the competitive stimulus hypothesis as follows:  “[u]nder this view, the 
previous lack of competition in monopoly local telephone markets may have dissuaded the 
I[ncumbent ]LECs from making certain investments, and the competitive stimulus from CLEC entry under 
the 1996 Act may have encouraged greater investment by both the ILECs and the CLECs.”  The author is 
not referring the DSL investment in particular, but the same notion applies to investment generally (Aghion 
et al. 2001). 
 
  19Since our cable modem data are not available for the full sample, in estimations 3 and 4 
we include only the CLEC variables for potential and actual competition.   
The coefficient for CLEC presence is not significant, but when the CLEC actually 
offers DSL, the impact is negative and significant.  The marginal effect of -0.001 for 
CLEC DSL presence from estimation 3 implies that when a CLEC is actively offering 
DSL service in the central office area, Ameritech is 0.1 percentage points less likely to 
deploy DSL itself.  When the state fixed effects are included in estimation 4, the marginal 
effect of DSL competition rises in magnitude to -0.26 percentage points.  Thus, while the 
potential broadband competition that a CLEC represents neither spurs not hinders 
deployment, actual competition in DSL is associated with less deployment by the 
incumbent.  The magnitude of the effect, however, is small. 
To explore the impact of the availability of cable modem service on DSL 
deployment, we turn to our subset of central offices for which we have both CLEC and 
cable modem data.  The carrying capacity hypothesis, which predicts a negative sign on 
coefficients for CLEC and cable modem presence in the central office area, depends 
crucially on other things in the market being equal.  If one fails to control adequately for 
the potential profitability of a market (through cost and demand variables), then the 
unobserved differences among markets may make it look like the presence of competitors 
is associated with greater DSL entry.  If areas expected to be more profitable a priori 
attract both DSL and cable modem entry, then not controlling adequately for expected 
profitability would lead to a false rejection of the carrying capacity hypothesis in favor of 
the competitive stimulus hypothesis.  The correlation between DSL and cable modem 
entry would not be causal in nature. 
  20To illustrate this point, we estimate a model controlling only for state fixed effects 
and the competition variables (estimation 5 in Table 4).  The presence of both cable 
modem and competitive DSL options for subscribers in the central office area is 
associated with a higher likelihood of deployment by the incumbent DSL provider.  
Before taking this as evidence for the competitive stimulus hypothesis, however, we 
control for other market factors affecting expected profitability in Estimation 6 (Table 4).  
The results show that negative coefficients for competitive DSL and cable modem service 
appear—results in accord with the evidence for the carrying capacity hypothesis found in 
Estimations 3 and 4.  We cannot include as many controls for market factors as in 
Estimations 3 and 4, due to the smaller sample size in Estimation 6.  The coefficients on 
the variables Cable modem presence and CLEC DSL presence are negative (but not 
statistically significant, however, due to the small sample size).  The marginal effect for 
CLEC DSL presence, 0.52 percentage points, is even higher than that estimated in the full 
sample.  Given these results, together with those from the larger estimations, it appears 
that support is greater for the carrying capacity hypothesis than the competitive stimulus 
hypothesis.   
The variable measuring potential competition, CLEC presence, is positive but not 
statistically significant.  Prieger (2003) found a positive correlation between CLEC 
presence and broadband provision, but could not separate provision from the incumbent 
local exchange company from other sources.  A positive association with DSL 
  21deployment by the incumbent may reflect a desire by Ameritech to beat the competition 
to market (and perhaps prevent the CLEC from entering the DSL market at all).
28
FUTURE TRENDS AND CONCLUSION 
Our empirical results for the determinants of the deployment of DSL broadband 
Internet connection indicate that the racial and ethnic composition of an area do not 
matter independently of related factors such as income and education.  The findings are 
in accord with the view that the firms are seeking to maximize profit (as required by their 
fiduciary responsibility to their stockholders).  Any apparent redlining in the region 
studied is completely explained by demand-side factors that affect profit.  Thus, to the 
extent that society desires to close what remains of the broadband digital divide in the 
U.S., either attention must be given to the demand side of the market or means should be 
found (through targeted subsidies, perhaps) to increase the firms’ profitability of entering 
less desirable areas.  In the latter case, however, subsidies may create their own 
distortions of economic efficiency, and the costs and benefits of policy intervention in the 
market must be carefully weighed. 
The experience in the U.S. with the diffusion of broadband since the early years 
examined here shows that the question of broadband deployment is not “if” but “when”.  
At the time of the data we examine, the FCC (2000b) found in its first comprehensive 
survey that there was at least one customer for high-speed service in 59% of all the postal 
code areas in the United States.  By the end of 2005, the same statistic rose to 99% of 
                                                 
28 Note that when the competition is potential but not actual, it is difficult to distinguish the competitive 
stimulus hypothesis from predatory conduct (i.e., investment undertaken specifically to deter entry (Dixit, 
1980)). 
  22postal code areas (FCC, 2006).
29  The speed at which the U.S. attained nearly ubiquitous 
broadband access is all the more remarkable given that (unlike some other countries) 
there are no general federal subsidy programs for either broadband infrastructure or 
household subscription.
30
Even though some form of broadband access is available in most areas of the U.S. 
today, the lessons learned from looking at the early years of adoption are still important.  
While broadband availability is necessary to close the digital divide, more is needed.  
Cooper (2004) emphasizes that bringing down the price of service is essential if lower-
income households are to be brought online.  Competition among providers holds the 
greatest promise for bringing down prices in the U.S., given the reluctance of the FCC to 
add broadband explicitly to the list of services supported under federal universal service 
programs.  As the market grows, it is reasonable to expect that the factors influencing 
future entrants in an area will follow patterns similar to that of the incumbent DSL 
entrant uncovered in this chapter.  Thus, understanding what drives initial DSL 
deployment lends insight into what drives increasing competition.
31
Furthermore, many countries around the world are in situations today similar to 
where the U.S. was five years ago.  In 2001, the U.S. had about a 4.5% subscription rate 
to broadband, which is higher than in Turkey, the Slovak Republic, Mexico, or Greece in 
2006, just to mention OECD countries.
32  If the profitability of geographical markets 
                                                 
29 Cable modem or DSL service was available in 87% of the ZIP codes.  Most of the remaining ZIP codes 
were covered by satellite. 
30 There are a few relatively small targeted federal infrastructure subsidy programs.  Two of these are the 
eRate program subsidizing broadband infrastructure for schools (Flamm, 2005) and the USDA Rural 
Development broadband program for rural LECs (Wallsten, 2005).  
31 See the chapter by Prieger and Lee in this volume for an exploration of how policies related to 
competition affect broadband deployment. 
32 Source of statistics:  OECD data for June 2006, released 13 October 2006, available at 
www.oecd.org/sti/ict/broadband. 
  23relative to each other in the U.S. is similar to that in other countries, then we should 
expect broadband to be available first in denser, urban areas with longer commutes, a 
more educated populace, and wealthier households.  Furthermore, intermodal competition 
(and thus lower prices) may be slower in coming than initial diffusion, as areas with an 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for the Central Office Level Data 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
DSL  0.051 0.220 0.000 1.000 
Race and Ethnicity             
%  Black  0.033 0.109 0.000 0.984 
%  Native  American 0.006 0.033 0.000 0.962 
%  Asian  0.007 0.017 0.000 0.315 
%  Other  0.023 0.070 0.000 1.000 
%  Hispanic  0.021 0.042 0.000 0.695 
Income and Poverty             
Income  (log)  10.652 0.245 9.613  11.911 
% in poverty  -2.628  0.615  -5.778  -0.724 
Size of Market             
Households (log)  7.369  1.507  -0.693  11.562 
Number of firms (log)  4.537  1.638  0.000  8.661 
Education profile             
% Less than H.S.  0.172  0.070  0.000  0.704 
%  Some  College  0.269 0.052 0.000 0.465 
%  College  Degree  0.104 0.061 0.000 0.447 
%  Graduate  Degree  0.053 0.044 0.000 0.429 
Commuting Profile             
% Work at home  0.046  0.033  0.000  0.356 
%  Commute  20-40  mins  0.348 0.109 0.020 0.713 
%  Commute  40-60  mins  0.104 0.059 0.000 0.556 
% Commute > 60 mins  0.069  0.045  0.000  0.499 
Other Demographics             
%  Female  0.500 0.028 0.062 0.728 
Median  Age  38.022  3.783 19.943 73.752 
Business Market             
Ave. workers/firm  2.253 0.671  -0.847 5.676 
% Small Firms  0.900  0.072   0.000  1.000 
Cost variables             
Pop. density (log)  4.479  1.680  -2.857  10.215 
Rural  0.846    0.361 0.000 1.000 
Phone density
†  4.059 1.114 0.525 6.908 
Structure  Age  (log) 3.571 0.297 1.747 4.126 
Competition      
Cable Modem Presence   0.338  0.474   0.000  1.000 
CLEC  DSL  Presence  0.083 0.275 0.000 1.000 
CLEC  Presence  0.871 0.335 0.000 1.000 
States             
Illinois  0.266 0.442 0.000 1.000 
Indiana  0.147 0.354 0.000 1.000 
Michigan  0.188 0.391 0.000 1.000 
Ohio  0.226 0.418 0.000 1.000 
Wisconsin  0.173 0.379 0.000 1.000 
†Phone density is transformed with a reverse log transformation: −ln(1−x).  
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Probit Estimations for the Availability of Broadband Service within a Central 





Race and Income 










          
Race  and  Ethnicity         
%  Asian  13.030***  0.621 0.000 7.408**  0.155 0.013 
%  Black  -0.701**  -0.033 0.034  1.199***  0.025 0.008 
% Native American  -127.046***  -6.057  0.002  -19.546  -0.410  0.510 
%  Other  -13.682**  -0.652 0.017 2.192  0.046 0.725 
%  Hispanic  8.591***  0.410 0.008  -0.219 -0.005 0.951 
Income and Poverty          
Income (log)        2.227***  0.047  0.000 
% in poverty        -0.269  -0.006  0.253 
Size of Market          
Households  (log)  0.216** 0.010 0.018 0.157  0.003 0.174 
Pop. density (log)  0.692***  0.033 0.000  0.852***  0.018 0.000 
Intercept  -7.364***   0.000  -33.406***   0.000 
Log Likelihood  -264.793  -220.818 
N  1,120 1,119 
Pseudo R
2  0.490 0.575 
* significant at the 10% level;   ** significant at the 5% level;   *** significant at the 1% level. 
Notes:  Dependent variable is 1 if there is at least one broadband customer in the Central Office serving 
area, 0 if not.  The sample includes all Ameritech central office areas.  Marginal effect is the marginal 
effect on the mean evaluated at the sample mean of x.  Asterisks and P-values are for the coefficient, not 
the marginal effect.   
  28Table 3:  Probit Estimations for the Availability of Broadband Service within a  
Central Office Area:  All Variables 
Estimation 3 
All Variables 
Estimation 4:  All Variables & 










Race and Ethnicity           
% Asian  12.345**  0.036  0.016 7.145 0.050  0.193 
% Black  0.143 0.000  0.866 0.172 0.001  0.859 
% Native American  3.515 0.010  0.943  -92.174  -0.639  0.255 
% Other  -1.875 -0.005  0.833 -8.318 -0.058  0.401 
% Hispanic  -3.316  -0.010  0.518 2.115 0.015  0.723 
Income and Poverty          
Income (log)  1.893**  0.006  0.039 0.887 0.006  0.367 
% in Poverty  0.056 0.000  0.892 0.304 0.002  0.485 
Size of Market          
Households (log)  0.296 0.001  0.116 0.275 0.002  0.172 
Number of Firms (log)  0.268* 0.001 0.086 0.357** 0.002 0.026 
Education profile          
% Less than H.S.  22.491*** 0.066 0.000 13.795** 0.096 0.019 
% Some College  12.621***  0.037  0.006 1.346 0.009  0.805 
% College Degree  3.314 0.010  0.355 1.455 0.010  0.705 
% Graduate Degree  8.004* 0.023  0.056 2.654 0.018  0.567 
Commuting Profile          
% Work at home  17.864 0.052 0.11 27.176**  0.188 0.018 
% Commute 20-40 mins  2.670* 0.008 0.095 3.918** 0.027 0.019 
% Commute 40-60 mins  17.069*** 0.050  0.000 16.393*** 0.114  0.000 
% Commute > 60 mins  -9.176***  -0.027 0.006 -7.704** -0.053 0.043 
Other Demographics          
% Female  -6.211  -0.018 0.198 -10.517**  -0.073 0.038 
Median Age  0.538* 0.002  0.070 0.401 0.003  0.208 
Median Age squared  -0.007* 0.000 0.096  -0.004  0.000 0.296 
Business Market          
Ave. Workers/Firm  1.135*** 0.003 0.002 1.189*** 0.008 0.002 
% Small Firms  7.399* 0.022  0.051 7.194* 0.050 0.06 
Cost variables          
Pop. Density (log)  0.708*** 0.002 0.001 0.784*** 0.005 0.001 
Rural  -0.804* -0.004 0.063 -0.939** -0.010 0.041 
Phone Density
†  0.611*** 0.002 0.002 0.681*** 0.005 0.001 
Structure Age < median (log)  0.965**  0.003  0.035 0.353 0.002  0.482 
Structure Age > median (log)  -1.762 -0.005  0.105 -1.813 -0.013  0.123 
States          
Michigan       0.792**  0.009  0.035 
Ohio       -0.613  -0.003  0.151 
Wisconsin       -0.001  0.000  0.999 
Competition          
CLEC Presence  -0.021 0.000  0.963 0.086 0.001  0.862 
CLEC DSL Presence  -0.517** -0.001 0.025 -0.544** -0.003 0.035 
Intercept  -64.317*** 0.036  0.000 -42.590*** 0.050  0.003 
Log Likelihood  -152.242  -133.255 
N  1,119 957 
Pseudo R
2  0.707 0.725 
* significant at the 10% level;   ** significant at the 5% level;   *** significant at the 1% level. 
†Phone density has a long left tail, and is transformed with a reverse log transformation: −ln(1−x). Omitted racial 
variable is White.  Omitted education variable is High School Degree.  Omitted commute variable is 1-20 minutes.   
Marginal effects for dummy variables are for a zero to one change in x.  Observations from Indiana are dropped 
from estimation 4 because no DSL is deployed in the state.  See notes to previous table. 
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Table 4 
Probit Estimations for the Availability of Broadband Service within a  
Central Office Area:  Competition Variables 










Competition           
Cable Modem Presence  0.898*** 0.270  0.000  -0.204 -0.003  0.442
CLEC Presence  0.719** 0.151 0.027  0.813 0.007 0.551
CLEC DSL Presence  -0.029 -0.008  0.867  -0.440 -0.005  0.187
Income and Poverty           
Income (log)      1.491 0.023 0.108
% in Poverty       -0.145 -0.002  0.775
Size of Market           
Households (log)       -0.380 -0.006  0.168
Number of Firms (log)       0.530*** 0.008 0.009
Other Demographics           
Median Age       -0.998** -0.015  0.028
Median Age squared       0.014** 0.000 0.028
Business Market           
Ave. Workers/Firm      0.448 0.007 0.464
% Small Firms      4.469 0.069 0.385
Cost variables           
Pop. Density (log)       1.264*** 0.019 0.000
Rural       -0.624 -0.009  0.537
Phone Density
†      0.226 0.003 0.444
Structure Age      0.454 0.007 0.471
Intercept   -1.800***    0.000  -15.522    0.212
State Fixed Effects  No Yes 
Log Likelihood  -175.104  -71.056 
N  374 360 
Pseudo R
2  0.116 0.634 
* significant at the 10% level;   ** significant at the 5% level;   *** significant at the 1% level. 
†Phone density is transformed with a reverse log transformation: −ln(1−x).  














































































Figure 2:  Comparison with FCC Data for Illinois 
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